Envy-freeness and Relaxed Stability under lower quotas by Krishnaa, Prem et al.
Envy-freeness and Relaxed Stability under lower
quotas
Prem Krishnaa1
Cohesity Storage Solutions India Pvt. Ltd, India
premkrishnaa.jaganmohan@cohesity.com
Girija Limaye
Indian Institute of Technology Madras, India
girija@cse.iitm.ac.in
Meghana Nasre
Indian Institute of Technology Madras, India
meghana@cse.iitm.ac.in
Prajakta Nimbhorkar
Chennai Mathematical Institute, India and UMI ReLaX
prajakta@cmi.ac.in
Abstract
We consider the problem of matchings under two-sided preferences in the presence of maximum as
well as minimum quota requirements for the agents. This setting, studied as the Hospital Residents
with Lower Quotas (HRLQ) in literature, models important real world problems like assigning medical
interns (residents) to hospitals, and teaching assistants to instructors where a minimum guarantee is
essential. When there are no minimum quotas, stability is the de-facto notion of optimality. However,
in the presence of minimum quotas, ensuring stability and simultaneously satisfying lower quotas is
not an attainable goal in many instances.
To address this, a relaxation of stability known as envy-freeness, is proposed in literature. In our
work, we thoroughly investigate envy-freeness from a computational view point. Our results show
that computing envy-free matchings that match maximum number of agents is computationally
hard and also hard to approximate up to a constant factor. Additionally, it is known that envy-free
matchings satisfying lower-quotas may not exist. To circumvent these drawbacks, we propose a
new notion called relaxed stability. We show that relaxed stable matchings are guaranteed to exist
even in the presence of lower-quotas. Despite the computational intractability of finding a largest
matching that is feasible and relaxed stable, we give efficient algorithms that compute a constant
factor approximation to this matching in terms of size.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Mathematics of computing → Graph theory; Theory of computa-
tion → Design and analysis of algorithms
Keywords and phrases Matchings under preferences, Lower quota, Hardness of approximation,
Approximation algorithms, Parameterized complexity
1 Introduction
Matching problems with two-sided preferences have been extensively investigated for matching
markets where agents (hospitals/residents or colleges/students) have upper quotas that can
not be exceeded. Stability [9] is a widely accepted notion of optimality in this scenario. An
allocation is said to be stable if no pair of agents has an incentive to deviate from it. However,
the case when the agents have maximum as well as minimum quotas poses new challenges
and there is still a want of satisfactory mechanisms that take minimum quotas into account.
1 Part of this work was done when the author was a Dual Degree student at IIT Madras.
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2 Envy-freeness and Relaxed Stability under lower quotas
Lower quotas are important from a practical perspective, since it is natural for a hospital
to require a minimum number of residents to run the hospital smoothly. The setting also
models important applications like course-allocation, and assigning teaching assistants (TAs)
in academic institutions where a minimum guarantee is essential.
Ensuring stability and at the same time satisfying lower quotas is not an attainable goal
in many instances. On one hand, disregarding preferences in the interest of satisfying the
lower quotas gives rise to social unfairness (for instance agents envying each other); on the
other hand, too much emphasis on fairness can lead to wastefulness [8]. Therefore, it is
necessary to strike a balance between these three mutually conflicting goals – optimality with
respect to preferences, feasibility for minimum quotas and minimizing wastefulness. The
main contribution of this paper is to propose a mechanism to achieve this balance.
Envy-freeness [8, 10, 14, 15, 5] is a widely accepted notion for achieving fairness from a
social perspective. Unfortunately, the two goals viz. envy-freeness and feasibility may not
be simultaneously achievable; whether feasible envy-free matchings exist can be answered
efficiently by the characterization of Yokoi [25]. Fragiadakis et al. [8] explore strategy-proof
aspects of envy-freeness and the trade-off between envy-freeness and wastefulness; however
their results are for a restricted setting of agent preferences. In our work, we thoroughly
investigate envy-freeness from a computational view point both in the general and restricted
settings. Our results show that computing envy-free matchings that match maximum number
of agents is computationally hard and even such matchings can be wasteful. To circumvent
these drawbacks, we propose a new notion called relaxed stability. We show that relaxed
stable matchings are guaranteed to exist even in the presence of lower-quotas. We additionally
show that a relaxed stable matching that is at least the size of the stable matching in the
instance (disregarding lower quotas) exists and can be efficiently computed. On the other
hand, if we insist for the largest size relaxed stable matching, computing such a matching
turns out to be computationally intractable.
We state the problem formally in terms of assigning a set of medical interns (residents) to
a set of hospitals where preferences are expressed by both the sets, and hospitals have upper
quotas and lower quotas associated with them. This is called the HRLQ setting in literature.
The input in the HRLQ setting is a bipartite graph G = (R ∪H, E) where R denotes the
set of residents, H denotes the set of hospitals, and an edge (r, h) ∈ E denotes that r and
h are mutually acceptable. A hospital h ∈ H has an upper-quota q+(h) which denotes the
maximum number of residents that can be assigned to h. Additionally, h has a lower-quota
q−(h) which denotes the minimum number of residents that must be assigned to h. Finally,
every vertex (resident and hospital) in G ranks its neighbors in a strict order, referred to as
the preference list of the vertex. If a vertex a prefers its neighbor b1 over b2, we denote it by
b1 >a b2.
A matching M ⊆ E in G is an assignment of residents to hospitals such that each resident
is matched to at most one hospital, and every hospital h is matched to at most q+(h)-many
residents. For a matching M , let M(r) denote the hospital that r is matched to, and M(h)
denote the set of residents matched to h in M . If resident r is unmatched in matching M
we let M(r) = ⊥ and ⊥ is considered as the least preferred choice by any resident. We say
that a hospital h is under-subscribed in M if |M(h)| < q+(h), h is fully-subscribed in M if
|M(h)| = q+(h) and h is deficient in M if |M(h)| < q−(h). A matching is feasible for an
HRLQ instance if no hospital is deficient in M . The goal for the HRLQ problem is to match
residents to hospitals optimally with respect to the preference lists such that the matching is
feasible. The HRLQ problem is a generalization of the well-studied HR problem (introduced
by Gale and Shapley [9]) where there are no lower quotas. In the HR problem, stability is a
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de-facto notion of optimality and is defined by the absence of blocking pairs.
I Definition 1 (Stable matchings). A pair (r, h) ∈ E\M is a blocking pair w.r.t. the matching
M if h >r M(r) and h is either under-subscribed in M or there exists at least one resident
r′ ∈M(h) such that r >h r′. A matching M is stable if there is no blocking pair w.r.t. M .
Existence of Stable Feasible Matchings: Given an HRLQ instance, it is natural to ask
“does the instance admit a stable feasible matching?" A stable matching always exists in an HR
instance and can be computed in linear time [9]. In contrast, there exist simple HRLQ instances
that may not admit any feasible and stable matching, even when a feasible matching exists.
r1 : h1, h2
r2 : h1
[0,1] h1 : r1, r2
[1,1] h2 : r1
Figure 1 An HRLQ instance with no feasible
and stable matching.
For example, Fig. 1 shows an HRLQ in-
stance with R = {r1, r2} and H = {h1, h2}.
where both hospitals have a unit upper-
quota and h2 has a unit lower-quota. We
denote the lower-quota and upper-quota of
hospital h using [q−(h), q+(h)] before hos-
pital h. The matching Ms = {(r1, h1)} is
stable but not feasible since h2 is deficient
in Ms. The matchings M1 = {(r1, h2)} and
M2 = {(r1, h2), (r2, h1)} are both feasible
but not stable since (r1, h1) blocks both of them. The existence question of a stable, feasible
matching for HRLQ can be answered by simply ignoring lower quotas and computing a stable
matching in the resulting HR instance. From the well-known Rural Hospitals Theorem [23],
the number of residents matched to a hospital is invariant across all stable matchings of the
instance. Hence, for any HRLQ instance, either all the stable matchings are feasible or all
are infeasible, and they have the same size.
Imposing lower quotas ensures that infeasible matchings are no longer acceptable, however,
the presence of lower quotas poses new challenges as discussed above. In light of the fact
that stable and feasible matchings may not exist, relaxations of stability, like popularity and
envy-freeness have been proposed in the literature [20, 19, 25]. Envy-freeness is defined by
the absence of envy-pairs.
I Definition 2 (Envy-free matchings). Given a matching M , a resident r has a justified envy
(here onwards called envy) towards a matched resident r′, where M(r′) = h and (r, h) ∈ E
if h >r M(r) and r >h r′. The pair (r, r′) is an envy-pair w.r.t. M . A matching M is
envy-free if there is no envy-pair w.r.t. M .
Note that an envy-pair implies a blocking pair but the converse is not true and hence
envy-freeness is a relaxation of stability. In the example in Fig. 1, the matching M1 is
envy-free and feasible, although not stable. Thus, envy-free matchings provide an alternative
to stability in such instances. Envy-freeness is motivated by fairness from a social perspect-
ive. Importance of envy-free matchings has been recognized in the context of constrained
matchings [8, 10, 14, 15, 5], and their structural properties have been investigated in [24].
∀i ∈ [n], ri : h1, h2
[0, n] h1 : r1, · · · , rn
[1, 1] h2 : r1, · · · , rn
Figure 2 An HRLQ instance with two envy-free
matchings of different sizes.
Size of envy-free matchings: In terms of
size, there is a sharp contrast between stable
matchings in the HR setting and envy-free
matchings in the HRLQ setting. While all
the stable matchings in an HR instance have
the same size, the envy-free matchings in an
HRLQ instance may have significantly differ-
ent sizes. Consider the example in Fig. 2
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with n residents R = {r1, r2, · · · , rn} and two hospitals H = {h1, h2}. The hospital h2 has
a unit upper-quota and a unit lower-quota. The instance admits an envy-free matching
N1 = {(r1, h2)} of size one and another envy-free matching Nn = {(r1, h1), (r2, h1), . . . ,
(rn−1, h1), (rn, h2)} of size n.
Shortcomings of envy-free matchings: It is interesting to note that a feasible, envy-free
matching itself may not exist – for instance, if the example in Fig. 1 is modified such that
both h1, h2 have a unit lower-quota, then M2 is the unique feasible matching. However, M2
is not envy-free since (r1, r2) is an envy-pair w.r.t. M2. If a stable matching is not feasible
in an HRLQ instance, wastefulness may be inevitable for attaining feasibility. A matching is
wasteful if there exists a resident who prefers a hospital to her current assignment and that
hospital has a vacant position [8]. Envy-free matchings can be significantly wasteful. For
instance, in the example in Fig. 2, the matching N1 is wasteful. Therefore, it would be ideal
to have a notion of optimality which is guaranteed to exist, is efficiently computable and
avoids wastefulness.
Quest for a better optimality criterion: We propose a new notion of relaxed stability
which always exists for any HRLQ instance. We observe that in the presence of lower quotas,
there can be at most q−(h)-many residents that are forced to be matched to h, even though
they have higher preferred under-subscribed hospitals in their list. Our relaxation allows
these forced residents to participate in blocking-pairs,2 however, the matching is still stable
when restricted to the remaining residents. We now make this formal below.
I Definition 3 (Relaxed stable matchings). A matching M is relaxed stable if, for every
hospital h, at most q−(h) residents from M(h) participate in blocking pairs and no unmatched
resident participates in a blocking pair.
r1 : h1, h3
r2 : h2, h3
r3 : h2
[0, 1] h1 : r1
[0, 1] h2 : r2, r3
[1, 1] h3 : r1, r2
Figure 3 An HRLQ instance with two relaxed
stable matchings of different sizes, one larger than
stable matching
We note that in the example in Fig. 1,
the matching M2 (which was not envy-free)
is feasible, relaxed stable and non-wasteful.
In fact, we show that every instance of the
HRLQ problem admits a feasible relaxed
stable matching – thus addressing the issue
of guaranteed existence. In terms of com-
putation, a relaxed stable matching can be
efficiently computed; however if we insist on
the maximum size relaxed stable matching,
we show that this problem is computation-
ally hard.
In order to ensure guaranteed existence of relaxed stable matchings, we need to allow upto
q−(h) many residents per hospital to participate in blocking pairs. We remark that Hamada
et al. [12] studied a similar notion of computing matchings with minimum blocking pairs.
Such matchings (MINBP) are guaranteed to exist, however, computing them is NP-hard even
under severe restrictions on the preference lists. Contrast this with relaxed stability which
is guaranteed to exist and a relaxed stable matching at least as large as a stable matching
(obtained by disregarding lower-quotas) is efficiently computable. In fact, a relaxed stable
matching may be even larger than the size of the stable matching in the instance, as seen in
the example in Fig. 3. In this instance, the stable matching Ms = {(r1, h1), (r2, h2)} of size
2 Our initial idea was to allow them to participate in envy-pairs. We thank anonymous reviewer for
suggesting this modification which is stricter than our earlier notion.
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two is infeasible. Matchings M ′1 = {(r1, h3), (r2, h2)} and M ′2 = {(r1, h1), (r2, h3), (r3, h2)}
both are relaxed stable and feasible andM ′2 is larger thanMs. This is in contrast to maximum
size envy-free matching which (as we will see in section 2.1) cannot be larger than the size of
a stable matching.
Our contributions: In this paper, we study the computational complexity, approximability,
parameterized complexity and the hardness of approximation for the notions of envy-freeness
and relaxed stability. Throughout, we assume that our input HRLQ instance admits some
feasible matching and our algorithms always aim to output a feasible matching that is
optimal. We consider the problem of computing a maximum-size, feasible, optimal matching
in an HRLQ instance when one exists. When the optimality criterion is envy-freeness, we
denote this as the MAXEFM problem, and the equivalent problem of computing an envy-free
matching that has the minimum number of unmatched residents as theMIN-UR-EFM problem.
For exact solutions, the two problems are equivalent. When the optimality criterion is relaxed
stability, we denote this as the MAXRSM problem.
Results on envy-freeness: We show that the MAXEFM problem is NP-hard, and in fact,
is hard to approximate below a constant factor.
I Theorem 4. The following hold:
(I) TheMAXEFM (equivalentlyMIN-UR-EFM) problem is NP-hard. Moreover, theMIN-UR-EFM
problem has no α-approximation algorithm for any factor α > 0 unless P = NP. Above
hardness results hold when
(a) every resident has a preference list of length at most two (upper-quotas of hospitals
can be arbitrary).
(b) every hospital has lower-quota and upper-quota at most one (resident preference lists
can be longer than two).
(II) The MAXEFM problem can not be approximated within a factor of 2119 unless P = NP
even when every hospital has a quota of at most one.
In light of the above negative result, we consider MAXEFM problem on restriction on HRLQ
instance, called the CL-restriction [12]. The restriction requires that every hospital with
positive lower-quota must rank every resident, and consequently, every resident ranks every
hospital with a positive lower quota. Note that in Fig. 1, the infeasibility of hospital
h2 could be resolved if h2 and r2 were mutually acceptable. In that case, the stable
matching {(r1, h1), (r2, h2)} is feasible and hence is a maximum size envy-free matching.
The CL-restriction has been considered by Hamada et al [12] where the goal is to output a
matching with minimum number of blocking pairs (MINBP) or blocking residents (MINBR).
Hamada et al. [12] proved that even under the CL-restriction, computing the MINBP and
MINBR problems are NP-hard. In contrast under the CL-restriction, MAXEFM (equivalently
MIN-UR-EFM) is tractable.
I Theorem 5. There is a simple linear-time algorithm for the MAXEFM (equivalently
MIN-UR-EFM) problem for CL-restricted HRLQ instances.
In practice it is common to have preference lists which are incomplete and in many cases
the preference lists of residents may also be constant size. Krishnapriya et al. [19] present
an algorithm that efficiently computes a maximal envy-free matching that extends a given
feasible matching. Matching M is a maximal envy-free matching if addition of any edge
to M violates either the upper-quota or envy-freeness. However, prior to this work, no
approximation guarantee of a maximal envy-free matching was known. We prove following
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guarantee on the size of a maximal envy-free matching. Let `1 be the length of the longest
preference list of a resident and `2 be the length of the longest preference list of a hospital.
I Theorem 6. A maximal envy-free matching is
(I) an `1-approximation of MAXEFM when hospital quotas are at most 1
(II) an (`1 · `2)-approximation of MAXEFM when quotas are unrestricted.
Besides the above results, we investigate the parameterized complexity of the problem. When
the stable matching is not feasible, there is at least one lower-quota hospital that is deficient.
Deficiency [12] of an HRLQ instance with respect to a stable matchingM is defined as follows.
I Definition 7. Let G = (R∪H, E) be an HRLQ instance and M be a stable matching in
G. Then deficiency(M) =
∑
h∈H
max{0, q−(h)− |M(h)|}.
We show that MAXEFM and MIN-UR-EFM are W[1]-hard when deficiency is the parameter.
We also show a polynomial size kernel and present FPT algorithms for the MAXEFM problem.
The respective parameters are defined in section 4.
I Theorem 8. The following hold:
(I) The MAXEFM and MIN-UR-EFM are W[1]-hard when deficiency is the parameter. The
hardness holds even when residents preference lists are of length at most two or hospital
quotas are 0 or 1.
(II) The MAXEFM has a polynomial size kernel.
(III) The MAXEFM admits FPT algorithms for several interesting parameters.
Results on relaxed stability: We prove that the MAXRSM problem is NP-hard and
is also hard to approximate, but has a better approximation behavior than the MAXEFM
problem.
I Theorem 9. The MAXRSM problem is NP-hard and cannot be approximated within a
factor of 2119 unless P = NP. The result holds even when all quotas are at most one.
We complement the above negative result with the following:
I Theorem 10. Any feasible HRLQ instance always admits a relaxed-stable matching.
Moreover, there is a polynomial-time algorithm that outputs a 32 -approximation to the max-
imum size relaxed stable matching.
We summarize our results in Table 1.
Related work: Various notions of optimality in the HRLQ setting have been studied in
[8, 12, 25, 20, 19]. Hamada et al. [12] consider computing feasible matchings with minimum
number of blocking pairs or blocking residents. However both these objectives are NP-hard
even under severe restrictions. A trade-off between envy-freeness and non-wastefulness is
considered in [8]. Another notion of optimality, namely popularity in the HRLQ problem
has been considered in [20]. Popularity can be regarded as overall stability. It was shown
in [20] that a matching which is popular amongst feasible matchings always exists. On the
flip-side, a popular matching is not guaranteed to be either envy-free or even relaxed stable.
Strategy-proof mechanisms for the lower quota setting are presented in [8]. In a different
setting with lower quotas, in which hospitals either fulfill required lower quotas or are closed
is studied in [2]. Lower quotas are also studied by [13] and [6] in the context of classified
stable matchings (CSM). Parameterized complexity for the problem of computing maximum
size stable matching with ties and incomplete lists (without lower quotas) is studied in [1].
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Problem Hardness and Inap-
proximability
Approximation and
parameterized res-
ults
Restricted settings
MAXEFM 2119 -inapproximability ,
W[1]-hard w.r.t. defi-
ciency
(`1 · `2)-approximation,
Polynomial kernel,
FPT for several
parameters
P-time for CL-restriction,
`1-approximation for 0/1
quotas
MIN-UR-EFM α-inapproximability
for any α > 0,
W[1]-hard w.r.t.
deficiency
– P-time for CL-restriction
MAXRSM 2119 -inapproximability
3
2 -approximation –
Table 1 Summary of our results
Organization of the paper: In section 2, we present our results related to NP-hardness and
hardness of approximation of MAXEFM and MIN-UR-EFM problems. In section 3, we present
our algorithmic results for MAXEFM and MIN-UR-EFM and our approximation results for
the MAXEFM problem. In section 4, we present our parameterized complexity results for the
MAXEFM problem. In section 5, we present hardness of approximation of MAXRSM followed
by an approximation algorithm. In section 6, we conclude and discuss open problems.
2 Envy-freeness: Hardness and Inapproximability
In this section we prove NP-hardness of the MAXEFM and MIN-UR-EFM problems for
arbitrary preference lists. We also prove that MIN-UR-EFM problem cannot be approximated
for any α > 0 and that MAXEFM problem cannot be approximated for a factor within 2119
unless P = NP.
2.1 Hardness Results for MAXEFM and MIN-UR-EFM
In order to show the hardness result, we show a reduction from Independent Set (IND-SET)
- a well-known NP-complete problem. Let 〈G = (V,E), k〉 be an instance of the IND-SET
problem where |V | = n and |E| = m. The goal in IND-SET is to decide whether G has
an independent set of size k i.e. a subset of k vertices that are pairwise non-adjacent. We
create an instance G′ = (R∪H, E′) of the MAXEFM problem as follows. For every vertex
vi ∈ V , we have a vertex-resident ri ∈ R; for every edge ej ∈ E, we have an edge-resident
r′j ∈ R. Thus |R| = m+n. The set H consists of n+1 hospitals, one hospital per vertex (hi
for vertex vi) in G and an additional hospital x. The hospital x has both lower-quota and
upper-quota as k. A hospital hi has zero lower-quota and an upper-quota equal to 1 + |Ei|
where Ei denotes the set of edges incident on vi in G. Let Ei denote the set of edge-residents
corresponding to edges in Ei.
Preference lists: The preferences (which also represent the underlying edge set E′) of
the residents and the hospitals can be found in Fig. 4. A vertex-resident ri has hi followed
by x. An edge-resident r′j has the two hospitals (denoted by hj1 and hj2) corresponding
to the end-points vj1, vj2 of the edge ej in any order. A hospital hi has the resident ri
followed by the edge-residents in Ei in any strict order. Finally the hospital x has all the n
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vertex-residents in any strict order.
Stable Matching in G′: It is straightforward to verify that a stable matching in G′ does
not match any resident to x, thus making it infeasible. We remark that this property is
necessary, otherwise as we prove (see Lemma 13) that if a stable matching Ms is feasible,
then Ms is itself a MAXEFM.
∀i ∈ [n], ri : hi, x
∀j ∈ [m], r′j : hj1, hj2
∀i ∈ [n], [0, |Ei|+ 1] hi : ri, Ei
[k, k] x : r1, r2, . . . , rn
Figure 4 Preference lists in the reduced instance G′ ofMAXEFM from instance 〈G, k〉 of IND-SET.
I Lemma 11. G has an independent set of size k iff G′ has an envy-free matching of size
m+ n.
Proof. Let S ⊆ V be an independent set of size k in G. We construct an envy-free matching
of size m+n in G′. If vi ∈ S, match the resident ri to the hospital x. When ri is matched to
x, any edge-resident r′j such that edge ej is incident on vi cannot be matched to hi, otherwise,
ri envies r′j . If vi /∈ S, match the resident ri to the hospital hi. Since S is an independent
set, at least one end-point of every edge is not in S. Thus, for an edge ej = (vj1, vj2),
the corresponding edge-resident r′j can be matched to at least one of hj1 or hj2 without
causing envy. Thus, every vertex-resident and every edge-resident is matched and we have
an envy-free matching of size m+ n.
For the other direction, let us assume that G does not have an independent set of size
k. Consider any envy-free matching M in G′. Due to the lower-quota of x, exactly k
vertex-residents must be matched to x in M . Let V ′ = {vi ∈ V | M(ri) = x}. Then,
|V ′| = k. Since V ′ is not an independent set, there exists an edge ej = (vj1, vj2) such that
vj1 ∈ V ′, vj2 ∈ V ′ that is the residents rj1 and rj2 are matched to x in M . This implies that
the edge-resident r′j must be unmatched in M , thus |M | < m+ n. J
Thus, MAXEFM is NP-hard. This implies that MIN-UR-EFM is also NP-hard. We observe
the following for the MIN-UR-EFM problem. When G has an independent set of size k,
there are zero residents unmatched in an optimal envy-free matching of G′, whereas when G
does not admit an independent set of size k, every envy-free matching leaves at least one
resident unmatched. This immediately implies that there is no α-approximation algorithm
for MIN-UR-EFM problem for any α > 0. Finally, note that in the reduced instance shown
in Fig. 4, every resident has exactly two hospitals in its preference list. This establishes
Theorem 4(I)(a).
Above NP-hardness and inapproximability results hold even when the hospital quotas are
at most one. Below we prove this result, however the resident preference lists are no longer of
length at most two. We modify above reduction from IND-SET problem as follows. We define
the vertex-residents ri, edge-residents r′j and sets Ei, Ei as done earlier. Let qi = |Ei|+ 1 for
all vertices vi ∈ V . For every vertex vi ∈ V , let Hi = {h1i , h2i , . . . , hqii } be the set of hospitals
corresponding to vi. Let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xk} be also a set of k hospitals. Every hospital in
set Hi has zero lower-quota and an upper-quota equal to 1. Every hospital xi ∈ X has both
lower and upper-quota equal to 1.
Preference lists: The preferences of the residents and the hospitals can be found in Fig. 5.
We fix an arbitrary ordering on sets X, Hi, Ei. A vertex-resident ri has the set Hi followed by
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set X. An edge-resident r′j has two sets of hospitals (denoted by Hj1 and Hj2) corresponding
to the end-points vj1, vj2 of the edge ej in any order. Every hospital h ∈ Hi has the vertex
-resident ri as its top-choice followed by the edge-residents in Ei in any strict order. Finally
the hospitals in X have in their preference lists all the n vertex-residents in any strict order.
Stable Matching in G′: It is straightforward to verify that a stable matching in G′ does
not match any resident to any hospital in set X, thus making it infeasible. Recall that this
property is necessary.
∀i ∈ [n], ri : Hi, X
∀j ∈ [m], r′j : Hj1, Hj2
∀i ∈ [n], t ∈ [qi], [0, 1] hti : ri, Ei
∀j ∈ [k], [1, 1] xj : r1, r2, . . . , rn
Figure 5 Reduced instance G′ of MAXEFM from instance 〈G, k〉 of IND-SET.
Note that every vertex vi has qi many hospitals - each with an upper quota of 1, so the set
of hospitals in Hi together have enough quota to get matched with the corresponding vertex-
resident ri and all the edge-residents corresponding to the edges incident on vi. Lemma 12
proves the correctness of the reduction. Hence, MAXEFM and MIN-UR-EFM are NP-hard
even if hospital quotas are at most one.
I Lemma 12. G has an independent set of size k iff G′ has an envy-free matching of size
m+ n.
Proof. Let S ⊆ V be an independent set of size k in graph G. We construct an envy-
free matching in G′ which matches all the residents in R. Let T be the set of residents
corresponding to the vertices vi ∈ S i.e. T = {ri | vi ∈ S}. Match T with X using Gale
and Shapley stable matching algorithm [9]. Let T ′ be the set of residents corresponding
to vertices vi such that vi /∈ S i.e. T ′ = {r1, r2, . . . , rn} \ T . Let H ′ be the set of hospitals
appearing in sets Hi such that vi ∈ S i.e. H ′ =
⋃
i:vi∈S
Hi. Match T ′ ∪ {r′1, . . . , r′m} with
H \H ′ \X using Gale and Shapley stable matching algorithm.
We now prove that the matching is envy-free. No pair of residents in T form an envy-
pair because we computed a stable matching between T and X. No pair of residents in
T ′ ∪ {r′1, . . . , r′m} form an envy-pair because we computed a stable matching between this
set and H \H ′ \X. Since, all hospitals in H ′ are forced to remain empty, no resident in set
T can envy a resident in set {r′1, . . . , r′m}. A resident in T ′ is matched to a higher preferred
hospital than any hospital in X, hence such resident cannot envy any resident in T . Thus,
the matching is envy-free.
We now prove that the matching size is m+n. Every vertex-resident ri is matched either
with some hospital in X or some hospital in Hi. Since, S is an independent set, at least one
end point of every edge is not in S. So for every edge et = (vt1, vt2), there is at least one
hospital in sets Ht1, Ht2 that can get matched with the edge-resident r′t without causing
envy. Thus, every edge-resident is also matched. Thus, we have an envy-free matching of
size m+ n.
For the other direction, let us assume that G does not have an independent set of size k.
Consider an arbitrary envy-free matching M in G′. Due to the unit lower-quota of every
xi ∈ X, exactly k vertex-residents must be matched to hospitals in X. Let S ⊆ V be the set
of vertices vi such that the corresponding vertex-resident ri is matched to some hospital in
X in M , i.e. S = {vi |M(ri) ∈ X}. So, |S| = k. Since, S is not an independent set, there
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exists at least two vertex-residents vs and vt matched to some hospital in X such that the
edge ej = (vs, vt) ∈ E. Due to the preference lists of the hospitals, all the hospitals in both
Hs and Ht sets must remain empty in M to ensure envy-freeness. This implies that the
edge-resident r′j must be unmatched. This implies that |M | < m+ n. This completes the
proof of the lemma. J
This establishes Theorem 4(I)(b). From Theorem 4(I) the NP-hardness holds for HRLQ
instances in which the residents have preference list of length at most 2 or hospital quotas
are at most one. In the case when both the restrictions hold, we show in section 3.3 that
MAXEFM admits a polynomial time algorithm. Now, we prove our claim that a stable
matching, when feasible is a maximum size envy-free matching.
I Lemma 13. A stable matching, when feasible is an optimal solution of MAXEFM.
Proof. We prove this by showing that an unmatched resident in a stable matching is
also unmatched in every envy-free matching. Let Me be an envy-free matching. Since,
the set of residents matched in a stable matching is invariant of the matching (by Rural
Hospital Theorem [23]), let’s pick an arbitrary stable matching Ms. Suppose for the sake
of contradiction that resident r1 is matched to hospital h1 in Me and unmatched in Ms.
Then, hospital h1 must be full in Ms and ∀r′ ∈Ms(h1), r′ >h1 r1. In Me at least one of the
residents from Ms(h1) is not matched to h1. Let that resident be r2. Then envy-freeness of
Me implies that r2 is matched in Me such that Me(r2) = h2 >r2 h1. By similar argument
as earlier, hospital h2 must be full in Ms and ∀r′ ∈ Ms(h2), r′ >h2 r2. This process must
terminate since there are finite number of residents and each is matched to at most one
hospital. But, we prove that such process cannot terminate, implying that the claimed r1
does not exist. Since Me is envy-free, once the process hits a resident ri, it must find a higher
preferred hospital hi than hi−1. While at a hospital, the process always finds a new resident.
While at a resident, it may hit some hospital more than once. We prove that in the latter
case also, eventually it must find a distinct resident.
Assume that for some resident ri, we have Me(ri) = hk ∈ {h1, h2, . . . , hi−2}. Hospital
hk is matched to ri and rk in Me and matched to rk+1 in Ms. If rk+1 is the only resident
matched to hospital hk in Ms, then (rk, hk) and (ri, hk) block Ms. Thus, there must exist
another resident r′ distinct from r1 to ri such that r′ >hk ri and r′ >hk rk and r′ ∈Ms(hk).
Thus, we showed that even at the repeated hospital hk, the process must find a distinct
resident. J
2.2 Inapproximability of MAXEFM
In this section, we show a reduction from the Minimum Vertex Cover (MVC) to the MAXEFM
which proves inapproximability when hospital quotas are at most one. We note that this
result subsumes the NP-hardness result proved in section 2.1 when hospital quotas are at
most one. Nevertheless the NP-hardness result proved in section 2.1 additionally hold for the
instance when resident list is of length at most two. It also shows strong inapproximability
for the MIN-UR-EFM problem and is also useful in showing W[1]-hardness when deficiency is
the parameter (Section 4).
Let G = (V,E) be an instance of MVC problem. The goal of MVC problem is to find a
minimum size vertex cover i.e. a subset V ′ of vertices such that each edge has at least one end-
point included in V ′. Our reduction is inspired by the reduction showing inapproximability
of the maximum size weakly stable matching problem in the presence of ties and incomplete
lists (MAX SMTI) by Halldórsson et al. [11]. The template of our reduction in this section
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(and also in section 5.1) is similar to that in [11]; however the actual gadgets in both the
sections bear no resemblance to the one in [11].
Reduction: Given a graph G = (V,E), which is an instance of the MVC problem, we
construct an instance G′ of the MAXEFM problem. Thus G′ is an HRLQ instance. Corres-
ponding to each vertex vi in G, G′ contains a gadget with three residents ri1, ri2, ri3, and four
hospitals hi1, hi2, hi3, hi4. All hospitals have an upper-quota of 1 and hi3 has a lower-quota of 1.
Assume that the vertex vi has d neighbors in G, namely vj1 , vj2 , . . . , vjd . The preference lists
of the three residents and four hospitals, are as in Fig. 6. We impose an arbitrary but fixed
ordering of the neighbors of vi in G which is used as a strict ordering of neighbors in the
preference lists of resident ri3 and hospital hi1 in G′. Note that G′ has N = 3|V | residents
and 4N3 hospitals.
ri1 : hi1
ri2 : hi2, hi1, hi3
ri3 : hi4, hi2, h
j1
1 , . . . , h
jd
1 , h
i
3
[0, 1] hi1 : ri2, r
j1
3 , . . . , r
jd
3 , r
i
1
[0, 1] hi2 : ri2, ri3
[1, 1] hi3 : ri3, ri2
[0, 1] hi4 : ri3
Figure 6 Preferences of residents and hospitals corresponding to a vertex vi in G for MAXEFM.
I Lemma 14. The instance G′ does not admit any stable and feasible matching.
Proof. The matching Ms = {(ri1, hi1), (ri2, hi2), (ri3, hi4) | i = 1, . . . , n} is stable in G′ since
every resident gets the first choice. Since Ms leaves hi3 deficient for each i, it is not feasible.
By the Rural Hospitals Theorem [23], we conclude that G′ does not admit any stable and
feasible matching. J
I Lemma 15. Let G′ be the instance of the MAXEFM problem constructed as above from
an instance G = (V,E) of the MVC problem. If V C(G) denotes a minimum vertex cover
of G and OPT (G′) denotes a maximum size envy-free matching in G′, then |OPT (G′)| =
3|V | − |V C(G)|.
Proof. We first prove that |OPT (G′)| ≥ 3|V | − |V C(G)|. Given a minimum vertex cover
V C(G) of G, we construct an envy-free matchingM for G′ as follows: M = {(ri2, hi3), (ri3, hi4) |
vi ∈ V C(G)} ∪ {(ri1, hi1), (ri2, hi2), (ri3, hi3) | vi /∈ V C(G)}. Thus, for a vertex vi in the vertex
cover, M leaves the resident ri1 unmatched, thereby matching only two residents in the
gadget corresponding to vi. For a vertex vi that is not in the vertex cover, M matches
all the three residents in the gadget corresponding to vi. Hence |OPT (G′)| ≥ |M | =
2|V C(G)|+ 3(|V | − |V C(G)|) = 3|V | − |V C(G)|.
B Claim 16. M is envy-free in G′.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that there is no envy-pair consisting of two residents
associated with the same vertex vi ∈ G. Now, without loss of generality, assume that ri3
envies a resident matched to hospital hj1. By construction of our preference lists, (vi, vj) is
an edge in G. Thus, at least one of vi or vj must belong to V C(G). If vi ∈ V C(G), then by
the construction of M , ri3 is matched to its top choice hospital hi4 in M and hence ri3 cannot
participate in an envy-pair. Also, hi1 is left unmatched, hence r
j
3 can not form an envy-pair
with M(hi1). C
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ri1
ri2
ri3
hi1
hi2
hi3
hi4
(a) Pattern 1
ri1
ri2
ri3
hi1
hi2
hi3
hi4
(b) Pattern 2
ri1
ri2
ri3
hi1
hi2
hi3
hi4
(c) Pattern 3
ri1
ri2
ri3
hi1
hi2
hi3
hi4
(d) Pattern 4
ri1
ri2
ri3
hi1
hi2
hi3
hi4
(e) Pattern 5
Figure 7 Five patterns possibly caused by vi
Now we prove that OPT (G′) ≤ 3|V | − |V C(G)|. Let M = OPT (G′) be a maximum size
envy-free matching in G′. Consider a vertex vi ∈ V and the corresponding residents and
hospitals in G′. Note that hi3 must be matched in M for i = 1, . . . , n. Hence following two
cases arise. Refer Fig. 7 for the patterns mentioned below.
Case 1: M(hi3) = ri3. Then either M(ri2) = hi2,M(ri1) = hi1 which is pattern 1 or
M(ri2) = hi1 and ri1 is unmatched (pattern 2), or M(ri2) = hi2 and M(hi1) = r
j
3 for some
(vi, vj) ∈ E (pattern 3).
Case 2: M(hi3) = ri2. Then (ri1, hi1) /∈ M , otherwise ri2 has a justified envy towards ri1.
Also, (ri3, hi2) /∈M otherwise ri2 has a justified envy towards ri3. Hence M(ri3) = hi4 (pattern
5) or M(ri3) = h
j
1 for some (vi, vj) ∈ E (pattern 4).
Vertex cover C of G corresponding to M : Using M , we now construct the set C of
vertices in G which constitute a vertex cover of G. If vi is matched as pattern 1 then vi /∈ C,
else vi ∈ C. From the following claim, it follows that C is a vertex cover of G.
B Claim 17. If (vi, vj) ∈ E, then the gadgets corresponding to both of them can not be
matched in pattern 1 in any envy-free matching M .
Proof. Let, if possible, there exist an edge (vi, vj) ∈ E such that the gadgets corresponding
to both vi and vj are matched in pattern 1 in M . Thus M(ri3) = hi3 and M(h
j
1) = r
j
1. But
then ri3 has justified envy towards r
j
1 (via hospital h
j
1), contradicting the envy-freeness of
M . C
Size of C: Each gadget could be matched in any of the patterns. Patterns 3 and pattern 4
occur in pairs for a pair of vertices vi, vj , that is, M(hi1) = r
j
3 or vice-versa. It can be verified
that there is no envy-pair among the six residents corresponding to the vertices vi, vj matched
as pattern 3 and pattern 4 respectively. We say that pattern 3 contributes 2.5 edges to M
and pattern 4 contributes 1.5 edges. Hence together they contribute to an average matching
size of 2. Only pattern 1 contributes 3 edges to M . Now it is straightforward to see that
|OPT (G′)| = 2|C| + 3(|V | − |C|) = 3|V | − |C|. Thus |V C(G)| ≤ |C| = 3|V | − |OPT (G′)|.
This completes the proof of the lemma. J
Now we prove the hardness of approximation for the MAXEFM problem. We assume
without loss of generality that an approximation algorithm for the MAXEFM problem
computes a maximal envy-free matching. Lemma 18 is analogous to Theorem 3.2 and
Corollary 3.4 from [11]. Proof of Lemma 18 uses the result of Lemma 15. For the sake of
completeness, we give the proof in Appendix A. This establishes Theorem 4(II).
I Lemma 18. It is NP-hard to approximate the MAXEFM problem within a factor of 2119 − δ,
for any constant δ > 0, even when the quotas of all hospitals are either 0 or 1.
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3 Envy-freeness: Algorithmic results
Given the NP-hardness of MAXEFM and MIN-UR-EFM problems, we turn our attention to
special cases of HRLQ instances which are tractable. One such restriction is the CL-restriction.
Next, we prove an approximation guarantee of any maximal envy-free matching.
3.1 Polynomial time algorithm for the CL-restricted instances
In this section, we consider the MAXEFM problem on CL-restricted HRLQ instances with
general quotas. We first note that every HRLQ instance with CL-restriction admits a feasible
envy-free matching. This follows from the characterization result of Yokoi [25] for instances
that admit a feasible envy-free matching. We now present a simple modification to the
standard Gale and Shapley algorithm [9] that computes a maximum size envy-free matching.
Our algorithm (Algorithm 1) is based on the ESDA algorithm presented in [8]. In [8], only
empirical results without theoretical guarantees on the size of the output matching are
presented. Their work also assumes that the underlying graph is complete. We prove that
Algorithm 1 produces maximum size envy-free matching assuming only the CL-restriction. We
start with an empty matching M . Throughout the algorithm, we maintain two parameters:
d : denotes the deficiency of the matching M , that is, the sum of deficiencies of all
hospitals with positive lower-quota.
k: the number of unmatched residents w.r.t. M .
In every iteration, an unmatched resident r who has not yet exhausted its preference list,
proposes to the most preferred hospital h. If h is deficient w.r.t. M , h accepts r’s proposal. If
h is not deficient, then we consider two cases. Firstly, assume h is under-subscribed w.r.t. M .
In this case h accepts the r’s proposal only if there are enough unmatched residents to satisfy
the deficiency of the other hospitals, that is, k > d. Next assume that h is fully-subscribed.
In this case, h rejects the least preferred resident in M(h) ∪ r. This process continues until
some unmatched resident has not exhausted its preference list.
We observe the following about the algorithm. Since the input instance is feasible, we
start with k ≥ d and this inequality is maintained throughout the algorithm. If no resident
is rejected due to k = d in line 11, then our algorithm degenerates to the Gale and Shapley
algorithm [9] and hence outputs a stable matching. Algorithm 1 is an adaptation of Gale
and Shapley algorithm [9] and runs in linear time in the size of the instance. Lemma 19
proves the correctness of our algorithm and establishes Theorem 5.
I Lemma 19. Matching M computed by Algorithm 1 is feasible and maximum size envy-free.
Proof. We first prove that the output is feasible. Assume not. Then at termination, d > 0,
that is, there is at least one hospital h that is deficient w.r.t. M . It implies that k ≥ 1. Thus
there is some resident r unmatched w.r.t. M . Note that r could not have been rejected by
every hospital with positive lower-quota since h appears in the preference list of r and h is
deficient at termination. This contradicts the termination of our algorithm and proves the
feasibility of our matching.
Next, we prove that M is envy-free. Suppose for the sake of contradiction, M contains
an envy-pair (r′, r) such that (r, h) ∈M where r′ >h r and h >r′ M(r′). This implies that
r′ must have proposed to h and h rejected r′. If h rejected r′ because |M(h)| = q+(h), h
is matched with better preferred residents than r′, a contradiction to the fact that r′ >h r.
If h rejected r′ because k = d, then there are two cases. Either r was matched to h when
r′ proposed to h. In this case, in line 11 our algorithm rejected the least preferred resident
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Algorithm 1: MAXEFM in CL-restricted HRLQ instances.
Input: An HRLQ instance G = (R∪H, E) with CL-restriction
Output: Maximum size envy-free matching
1 let M = φ; d =
∑
h:q−(h)>0
q−(h); k = |R|;
2 while there is an unmatched resident r which has at least one hospital not yet proposed
to do
3 r proposes to the most preferred hospital h;
4 if |M(h)| < q−(h) then
5 M =M ∪ {(r, h)};
6 reduce d and k each by 1;
7 else
8 if |M(h)| == q+(h) then
9 let r’ be the least preferred resident in M(h) ∪ r;
10 M(h) =M(h) ∪ r \ r′;
11 if |M(h)| < q+(h) and k == d then
12 let r′ be the least preferred resident in M(h) ∪ r;
13 M(h) =M(h) ∪ r \ r′;
14 else
// we have |M(h)| < q+(h) and k > d
15 M =M ∪ {(r, h)};
16 reduce k by 1;
17 return M ;
in M(h). This contradicts that r′ >h r. Similarly if r proposed to h later, since k = d,
the algorithm rejected the least preferred resident again contradicting the presence of any
envy-pair.
Finally, we show that M is a maximum size envy-free matching. We have k ≥ d at the
start of the algorithm. If during the algorithm, k = d at some point, then at the end of the
algorithm we have k = d = 0, implying that, we have an R-perfect matching and hence the
maximum size matching. Otherwise, k > d at the end of the algorithm and then we output
a stable matching which is maximum size envy-free by Lemma 13. J
3.2 Approximation guarantee of a maximal envy-free matching
As mentioned earlier, Krishnapriya et al. [19] present an algorithm to compute a maximal
envy-free matching that extends a given envy-free matching. However, their results are
empirical and no theoretical guarantees are known about the size of a maximal envy-free
matching. In this section we present approximation guarantee of a maximal envy-free
matching. Below we prove the first part of the Theorem 6 for the restricted instance where
hospital quotas are at most 1.
Proof of Theorem 6(I). Let M be a maximal envy-free matching and OPT be a MAXEFM.
Let ROPT and RM denote the set of residents matched in OPT and M respectively. Let X1
be the set of residents matched in both M and OPT . Let X2 be the set of residents matched
in OPT but not matched inM . Thus, |ROPT | = |X1|+ |X2|. Since X1 = ROPT ∩RM ⊆ RM ,
so |X1| ≤ |RM |. Our goal is to show that |X2| ≤ |RM | · (`1 − 1). Once we establish that, it
is immediate that a maximal envy-free matching is an `1-approximation.
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We show that for every resident r ∈ X2 we can associate a unique hospital hr such that
hr is unmatched in M and there exists a resident r′ in the neighbourhood of hr such that r′
is matched in M . Denote the set of such hospitals as Y2. Note that due to the uniqueness
assumption |X2| = |Y2|. Since each resident has a preference list of length at most `1, any r′
who is matched in M can have at most `1 − 1 neighbouring hospitals which are unmatched
in M . Thus |X2| = |Y2| ≤ |RM | · (`1 − 1) which establishes the approximation guarantee. To
finish the proof we show a unique hospital hr with desired properties that can be associated
with each r ∈ X2. Let r ∈ X2 such that h = OPT (r). We have following two exhaustive
cases.
Case 1: If h is unmatched in M , then due to maximality of M , there must exist a resident
r′ matched inM such that adding (r, h) causes envy to r′. Thus, h has a neighboring resident
r′ matched in M , and we let hr = h.
Case 2: If h is matched in M , then since M and OPT are both envy-free, there must
exist a path 〈r, h, r1, h1 , . . . , ri, hi〉 such that (r, h) ∈ OPT , for each k = 1, . . . , i, we have
(rk, hk) ∈ OPT , (r1, h) ∈ M , for each k = 2, . . . , i, we have (rk, hk−1) ∈ M and hi is
unmatched in M . Thus, hi has a neighboring resident ri matched in M , and we let hr = hi.
Uniqueness guarantee: For any r ∈ X2 for which case 1 applies, the associated hi is unique
since hospital quotas are at most 1. For two distinct r, r′ ∈ X2 such that for both case 2
applies, the paths mentioned above are disjoint since all hospital quotas are at most 1, which
guarantees uniqueness within case 2. The hi associated in case 2 cannot be associated in
case 1 to OPT (hi) since OPT (hi) = ri /∈ X2. This completes the proof of existence of the
unique hospital. J
Now, we prove the second part of the Theorem 6 for the unrestricted quotas.
Proof of Theorem 6(II). We will use the RM , ROPT , X1, X2 sets as defined earlier in the
proof of Theorem 6(I). It is clear that |X1| ≤ |RM |. We will show that |X2| ≤ |RM |·(`1 ·`2−1).
Once we establish that, it is immediate that a maximal envy-free matching is an (`1 · `2)-
approximation. We show that for every resident r ∈ X2 we can associate a unique edge (hr, rt)
such that hr is under-subscribed in M and there exists a resident rt in the neighbourhood of
hr such that rt is matched inM . Denote the set of such hospitals as Y2. Because each hospital
can have at most `2 edges (and all of them could be matched in OPT ), thus |X2| ≤ |Y2| · `2.
Since each resident has a preference list of length at most `1, any r′ who is matched in M
can have at most `1 neighbouring hospitals which are under-subscribed in M . Resident r′
is matched to one of these hospitals, thus, |X2| ≤ |RM | · (`1 · `2 − 1) which establishes the
approximation guarantee. To finish the proof we show a unique edge (hr, rt) at a hospital
hr with desired properties that can be associated with each r ∈ X2. Let r ∈ X2 such that
h = OPT (r). We have following two exhaustive cases.
Case 1: If h is under-subscribed in M , then due to maximality of M , there must exist a
resident r′ matched inM such that adding (r, h) causes envy to r′. Thus, h has a neighboring
resident r′ matched in M , i.e. we let (hr, rt) = (h, r′).
Case 2: If h is fully-subscribed in M , then since M and OPT are both envy-free,
there must exist a path 〈r, h, r1, h1 , . . . , ri, hi〉 (hospitals can repeat along this path) such
that (r, h) ∈ OPT , for each k = 1, . . . , i, we have (rk, hk) ∈ OPT , (r1, h) ∈ M , for each
k = 2, . . . , i, we have (rk, hk−1) ∈M and all hospitals h, h1, . . . , hi−1 are fully-subscribed in
M and hi is under-subscribed in M . Thus, hi has a neighbouring resident ri matched in M ,
i.e. we let (hr, rt) = (hi, ri).
Uniqueness guarantee: For any r ∈ X2 for which case 1 applies, the associated (h, r′) edge is
unique. For r ∈ X2 such that case 2 applies for r, at each hospital h′ ∈ {h, h1, . . . hi−1}, if
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h′ has k OPT -edges incident on it, then h′ must have at least k M -edges incident on it such
that all M -edge partners are higher preferred than all OPT -edge partners. Thus, if h′ is
shared across paths starting at multiple residents in X2, there must exist a unique M -edge
that extends the specific path for which leads to a unique OPT -edge to the next hospital,
otherwise h′ is under-subscribed in M , a contradiction. This guarantees uniqueness of edge
within case 2. The (hi, ri) associated in case 2 cannot be associated in case 1 to ri since
ri /∈ X2. This completes the proof of existence of the unique edge at a desired hospital and
also the proof of the lemma. J
3.3 Polynomial time algorithm for MAXEFM for a restricted setting
We present an algorithm (Algorithm 2) that computes a maximum envy-free matching
when the resident lists are of length at most two and hospitals quotas are at most one. At
a high-level Algorithm 2 works as follows: It starts with any feasible envy-free matching
(possibly output of Yokoi’s EF-HR-LQ Algorithm [25]) and computes an envy-free augmenting
path with respect to the current matching. An augmenting path P with respect to an
envy-free matching M is envy-free if M ⊕ P is envy-free. To compute such a path, the
algorithm deletes a set of edges from the graph. To define these deletions, we need the
following definition from [19].
I Definition 20. [19] Let h be any hospital in G, a threshold resident r′ for h, if one exists,
is the most preferred resident of h such that h >r′ M(r′). If no such resident exists, we
assume a unique dummy resident dh at the end of h’s preference list to be the threshold
resident for hospital h.
Algorithm 2: Algorithm to compute a maximal envy-free matching
Input: An HRLQ instance G = (R∪H, E)
Output: A maximal envy-free matching in G
1 Let M be any feasible envy-free matching in G (assume that M exists);
2 repeat
3 Compute the threshold resident r′ for all h ∈ H w.r.t. M ;
4 Let G′ = (R∪H, E′) be an induced sub-graph of G, where E′ = E \ (E1 ∪ E2),
E1 = {(r, h)| (r, h) ∈ E \M , r′ >h r},
E2 = {(r, h)| (r, h) ∈ E \M , r >h r′ and M(r) >r h};
5 if there exists an augmenting path P w.r.t. M in G′ then
6 MP =M ⊕ P ;
7 M =MP ;
8 else
9 Exit the loop.
10 until true;
11 Return M ;
In every iteration of our algorithm, we compute the threshold resident for every hospital.
Observe that unless the threshold resident r′ is matched to h or to a hospital h′ >r′ h, no
resident r′′ <h r′ can be matched to h. Thus, in our algorithm, we delete the set of edges E1
(see Step 4) which correspond to lower preferred residents than the threshold resident for a
hospital. If r >h r′ such that M(r) 6= h and M(r) >r h then we delete edge (r, h) (set of E2
edges). Note that both these deletions ensure that after augmentation, a resident never gets
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r1 : h1, h4
r2 : h2, h3, h4
r3 : h3
[0, 1] h1 : r1
[0, 1] h2 : r2
[0, 1] h3 : r2, r3
[1, 1] h4 : r1, r2
M = {(r1, h1), (r2, h4)}
M ′ = {(r1, h4), (r2, h2), (r3, h3)}
(a) Quotas at most one, but resident prefer-
ence lists longer than two.
r1 : h1, h2
r2 : h1
r3 : h3, h2
[0, 2] h1 : r1, r2
[1, 1] h2 : r1, r3
[0, 1] h3 : r3
M = {(r1, h2), (r3, h3)}
M ′ = {(r1, h1), (r2, h1), (r3, h2)}
(b) Resident preference lists at most length
two, but quotas more than 1
Figure 8 HRLQ instances and envy-free matchings M and M ′
demoted (matched to a lower preferred hospital). It is easy to see that the algorithm has at
most n iterations each taking O(m+ n) time, thus the overall running time is O(mn).
As the proof of Theorem 4(I) mentions, the NP-hardness applies to the HRLQ instances
in which either the residents have preference list of length at most 2 or hospital quotas are
at most one. The HRLQ instance in Fig. 8a has quotas at most one but a resident with a
three-length list. The example instance in Fig. 8b has lengths of all residents at most two but
the quotas are not at most one. In both the examples, we have an initial envy-free matching
M and a larger envy-free matching M ′. However, there is no envy-free augmenting path
w.r.t. M . In contrast, when we impose the restriction that all quotas are at most one and
every resident’s list is of length at most two (denoted as 01-HRLQ-2R restriction), we have
the desired envy-free augmenting paths. We prove this guarantee below.
I Lemma 21. If M and M∗ are envy-free matchings in a 01-HRLQ-2R instance and |M∗| >
|M |, then M admits an envy-free augmenting path.
Proof. Consider the symmetric difference M ⊕M∗. There must exist an augmenting path
P = 〈r1, h1, r2, h2, . . . , rn, hn〉 w.r.t. M where r1 is unmatched and hn under-subscribed in
M . Further, for each i = 1, . . . , n, M∗(ri) = hi. We note that r1 prefers M∗ over M (being
matched versus being unmatched) and since M∗ is envy-free, it must be the case that h1
prefers r2 over r1 (else r1 envies r2 w.r.t. M∗.) Since M is also envy-free, we conclude that
every resident ri in P prefers M∗(ri) over M(ri); and every hospital hi prefers ri+1 over ri.
If M ⊕ P is envy-free, we are done. Therefore assume that M ′ =M ⊕ P is not envy-free.
Let r have justified envy towards r′ w.r.t. M ′. We first note that if both r and r′ belong to
P , then M∗ is not envy-free. Similarly if both r and r′ do not belong to P , then M is not
envy free. Thus exactly one of r or r′ belong to P .
We now claim that no resident ri, for i = 1, . . . , n belonging to the path P can have
justified envy to any resident outside the path. Note that every resident in P gets promoted
in M ′ as compared to M . Thus if some ri = r envies r′ w.r.t. M ′, the same envy pair exists
w.r.t. to M , a contradiction. Thus it must be the case that a resident r not belonging to P
envies a resident r′ = ri belonging to P . We argue that r must be unmatched in M . First
note that since r envies ri, there exists an edge (r, hi) in the graph. Note that the edge (r, hi)
neither belongs to M nor to M∗, because every hi except hn is matched in both and M and
M∗ along residents in P . Consider M∗(r) = h, then there exists an edge (r, h). Since hi 6= h
and the length of preference list of r is at most two, we conclude that r must be unmatched
in M . Thus any resident r that envies a resident r′ along P is unmatched in M .
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We now show that if M ⊕ P is not envy-free, we can construct another path P ′ starting
at such an unmatched resident such that M ⊕ P ′ is envy-free. Recall the augmenting path
P = 〈r1, h1, r2, h2, . . . , rn, hn〉 w.r.t. M . Let hi be the hospital closest to hn along this path
such that there exists an unmatched resident r such that (r, hi) is in the graph and r envies
ri w.r.t. M ′. If there are multiple such residents, pick the one that is most preferred by hi.
Now consider the path P ′ = 〈r, hi, ri+1, . . . , rn, hn〉. Note that by the choice of the hospital
hi, M ⊕ P ′ is envy-free. This gives us the desired path P ′. J
I Lemma 22. Matching M produced by Algorithm 2 is an envy-free matching.
Proof. We first argue that M is envy-free. Assume not. Consider the first iteration (say i-th
iteration) during the execution of the algorithm in which an envy-pair is introduced. Call
the matching at the end of iteration i as Mi. Let that envy-pair be (r, r′) w.r.t. Mi where
Mi(r′) = h, and r >h r′ and h >r Mi(r). We consider two cases depending on whether or
not the edge (r′, h) belongs to Mi−1.
Case 1: Assume (r′, h) ∈ Mi−1. In this case, Mi−1(r) >r h, otherwise r envies r′ w.r.t.
Mi−1, a contradiction. Now since the algorithm never demotes any resident, it implies that
Mi(r) >r h, contradicts that that r envies r′ w.r.t. Mi.
Case 2: Assume (r′, h) /∈Mi−1. If Mi−1(r) <r h then either r or a higher preferred resident
than r is a threshold for h. Thus the edge (r′, h) ∈ E1 and hence gets deleted. Else
Mi−1(r) >r h. In this case by the same argument as above, r does not envy r′.
Thus, M is an envy-free matching in G. J
I Lemma 23. Algorithm 2 produces maximum size envy-free matching if every resident’s
preference list has length at most 2 and all the quotas are at most 1.
Proof. Let M be the output of Algorithm 2 on a restricted instance G. Lemma 22 shows
that M is envy-free. For the sake of contradiction, assume that M is not maximum size
envy-free. Let M∗ be an envy-free matching in G with |M∗| > |M |. Consider the symmetric
difference M ⊕M∗. There must exist an augmenting path P = 〈r1, h1, r2, h2, . . . , rn, hn〉
w.r.t. M where r1 and hn are unmatched in M . Moreover M ⊕ P is envy-free by Lemma 21.
Further, for each i = 1, . . . , n, M∗(ri) = hi. We note that r1 prefers M∗ over M (being
matched versus being unmatched) and since M∗ is envy-free, it must be the case that h1
prefers r2 over r1 (else r1 envies r2 w.r.t. M∗.) Since M is also envy-free, we conclude
that every resident ri in P prefers M∗(ri) over M(ri); and every hospital hi prefers ri+1
over ri. If all the M∗ edges in this path belong to E′ in the final iteration of Algorithm 2,
then we arrive at a contradiction. Hence there exists some edge (ri, hi) ∈M∗ ∩ P such that
(ri, hi) 6∈ E′; that is (ri, hi) was deleted either as an E1 or E2 edge in Step 4 of Algorithm 2.
Suppose (ri, hi) ∈ E1, then there exists a threshold resident for hi, say r′ which hi prefers
over ri. Note that, by definition of threshold resident, r′ is matched in M to some hospital
h′ that it prefers lower over hi. Since preference lists of residents are at most length two, r′
is not adjacent to any other hospital. We now contradict that M∗ is envy-free by observing
that q+(hi) = 1 and M∗(ri) = hi. Thus for M∗ to be envy-free, r′ must be matched in M∗
to some hospital that is higher preferred than hi. However, no such hospital exists, which
implies that r′ must remain unmatched in M∗ and thus envies ri. This implies that M∗ is
not envy-free; a contradiction. Now, let (ri, hi) ∈ E2. It implies that ri was higher preferred
by hi than its threshold resident in the last iteration and M(ri) was higher preferred by ri
than hi = M∗(ri). This is a contradiction to the fact that each ri in P prefers its M∗(ri)
over M(ri). This completes the proof. J
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4 Envy-freeness: Parameterized complexity
In this section, we investigate parameterized complexity of the MAXEFM and MIN-UR-EFM
problems. We refer the reader to the comprehensive literature on parametric algorithms
and complexity [4, 22, 7] for standard notation used in this section. Since the difficulty
of MAXEFM lies in the instances where stable matchings are not feasible, we choose the
parameters related to those hospitals which have a positive lower quota (denoted by HLQ)
In particular, the deficiency of a given HRLQ instance (see Definition 7 from Section 1) is a
natural parameter. Unfortunately, the problem turns out to be W[1]-hard for this parameter.
Proof of Theorem 8(I). Consider the parameterized version of IND-SET problem i.e. a
graph G and solution size k as the parameter. Let (G′, k′) be parameterized reduced instance
of MAXEFM, where k′ is the deficiency of G′ and let k′ be the parameter. From the NP-
hardness reduction given in section 2.1, we already saw that the stable matching in G′
has deficiency k. Then, with k′ = k, the same reduction is a valid FPT reduction. It
implies that that MAXEFM and MIN-UR-EFM are W[1]-hard, otherwise it contradicts to the
W[1]-hardness of IND-SET [4]. J
4.1 A polynomial size kernel
In this section, we give a kernelization result for HRLQ instances with hospital quotas either
0 or 1. We consider the following three parameters.
`: The size of a maximum matching in a given HRLQ instance.
p: The highest rank of any lower-quota hospital in any resident’s preference list.
t: Maximum number of non-lower-quota hospitals shared by the preference lists of any
pair of residents.
Given the graph G and k we construct a graph G′ such that G admits an envy-free matching
of size k iff G′ admits an envy-free matching of size k.
Construction of the graph G′: We start by computing a stable matching Ms in G(V,E).
If |Ms| < k, we have a “No" instance by Lemma 13. If |Ms| ≥ k and Ms is feasible, we have
a “Yes" instance. Otherwise, |Ms| ≥ k but it is infeasible. We know that |Ms| ≤ `. We
construct the graph G′ as follows.
Let X be the vertex cover computed by picking matched vertices in Ms. Then, |X| ≤ 2`.
Since, Ms is maximal, I = V \X is an independent set. We now use the marking scheme
below to mark edges of G which will belong to the graph G′.
Marking scheme: Our marking scheme is inspired by the marking scheme for the kerneliz-
ation result in [1]. Every edge with both end points in X is marked. If h ∈ X is a hospital,
we mark all edges with other end-point in the independent set I if the number of such edges
are at most `+1. Otherwise we mark the edges corresponding to the highest preferred (`+1)
residents of h. If r ∈ X is a resident then we do following: Let pr denote the highest rank of
any lower-quota hospital in the preference list of r. Every edge between r and an hospital at
rank 1 to pr is marked. There can be at most p edges marked in this step. We now construct
a set of hospitals Cr corresponding to r. The set Cr consists of non-lower-quota hospitals
which are common to the preference list of r and some matched resident in Ms. That is,
Cr = {h ∈ H | q−(h) = 0 and ∃r′ ∈ X, r′ 6= r and h is in preference list of both r and r′}.
Mark all edges of the form (r, h) where h ∈ Cr, if not already marked. Now amongst the
unmarked edges incident on r (if any exists) mark the edge to the highest preferred hospital
h. We are now ready to state the reduction rules using the above marking scheme.
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Reduction rules: We apply the following reduction rules as long as they are applicable.
1. If v ∈ G is isolated, delete it.
2. If (r, h) edge is unmarked, delete it.
Thus, we obtain an instance G′ = (V ′, E′) where V ′ = X ∪ I and E′ = E(X,X) ∪ E(X, I),
where E(A,B) is the set of edges with one end point in A and other in B.
Lemma 24 below bounds the size of the kernel G′.
I Lemma 24. The graph G′ has poly(`, p, t)-size.
Proof. We know that |X| ≤ 2`. Thus, E(X,X) = O(l2). Let XH ⊂ X, be the set of
hospitals in X and XR ⊂ X = X\XH be the set of residents in X. Then, |XH | = |XR| ≤ `.
For a hospital h ∈ XH , we have at most `+1 marked edges having its other end-point in the
independent set I. For a resident r ∈ XR, we retained edges with at most p+ t(`− 1) + 1
hospitals in independent set I. Hence, |E(X, I)| ≤ |XR| · (p+ t`− t+ 1) + |XH | · (`+ 1) =
O(`(p+ t`− t+ 1) + `2). Since I is independent set, |I| = |E(X, I)|. Thus, the size of G′ is
O(`2 + `(p+ t`− t+ 1)). J
Safeness of first reduction rule is trivial. Lemma 25 and Lemma 26 prove that the second
reduction rule is safe. So, G′ is a kernel.
I Lemma 25. If G′ has a feasible envy-free matching M ′ such that |M ′| ≥ k then M ′ is
feasible and envy-free in G.
Proof. Since, M ′ ⊆ E′ ⊆ E, so feasibility in G follows. Suppose for the contradiction that
M ′ is not envy-free in G. Then there exists a deleted edge (x, y) such that it causes envy.
By the claimed envy, x prefers y over M ′(x) and y prefers x over M ′(y) .
Suppose x is a hospital. Since, (x, y) is deleted, there are `+ 1 marked neighbors of x, all
more preferred than y. Since size of maximum matching is at most `, there exists a marked
neighbor of x, say y′ who is unmatched in M ′. Since, x prefers y′ over y it implies, x prefers
y′ over M ′(x) implying that in G′, y′ envies M ′(x) – a contradiction since M ′ is envy-free.
Suppose x is a resident. Given that (x, y) was deleted, y is non-lower-quota hospital.
Since x participates in an envy pair, there are at least two residents x and M ′(y) which
have a common hospital y in their preference list. Thus by our marking scheme, (x, y) is not
deleted – a contradiction. J
I Lemma 26. If G has a feasible envy-free matching M such that |M | ≥ k then there exists
a feasible envy-free matching M ′ in G′ such that |M ′| ≥ k.
Proof. If all the edges in M are present in G′ then M ′ =M and we are done. Suppose not,
then there exists an edge (x, y) ∈M \ E′. Let x be a hospital, then since (x, y) was deleted
y ∈ I. Note that y is unmatched in Ms in G. By Lemma 13 y cannot be matched in any
envy-free matching, which contradicts that (x, y) ∈ M . Thus x must be a resident. Since
(x, y) is deleted, then there exists a hospital h present only in preference list of x such that
(x, y) ∈ E′. By the marking scheme, x prefers h over y. Thus, let M ′ =M \ (x, y) ∪ (x, h),
which is envy-free since there is no other resident in the preference list of h other than x. J
This establishes Theorem 8(II).
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4.2 A maximum matching containing a given envy-free matching
The MAXEFM problem has a polynomial-time algorithm when either there are no lower-quota
hospitals or when all the lower-quota hospitals have complete preference lists. This fact
suggests two parameters – number of lower-quota hospitals in a given instance (q), and
maximum length of the preference list of any lower-quota hospital (`). Our parameterized
algorithm for the parameters q and ` and other parameterized algorithms, described in Section
4.3, make crucial use of an algorithm to extend an envy-free matching M to a maximum size
envy free matching M∗, such that M ⊆M∗. This algorithm was presented in [19] where it
was proved that it produces a maximal envy-free matching containing the given envy-free
matching M . We present the algorithm of [19] for completeness and prove that it outputs a
maximum size envy-free matching containing M .
We recall their algorithm below as Algorithm 3. However, unlike Algorithm 2 in [19],
where they start with Yokoi’s output [25], we start with any feasible envy-free matching
M . Since M need not be a minimum size envy-free matching, in line 4, we set q+(h) in G′
as q+(h)− |M(h)|. Lemma 13 proves that a stable matching is a maximum size envy-free
Algorithm 3: Maximum size envy-free matching containing M [19]
Input: Input : G = (R∪H, E), M = a feasible envy-free matching in G
1 Let R′ be the set of residents unmatched in M
2 Let H′ be the set of hospitals such that |M(h)| < q+(h) in G
3 Let G′ = (R′ ∪H′, E′) be an induced sub-graph of G, where
E′ = {(r, h) | r ∈ R′, h ∈ H′, h prefers r over its threshold resident rh}
4 Set q+(h) in G′ as q+(h)− |M(h)| in G
5 Each h has the same relative ordering on its neighbors in G′ as in G
6 Compute a stable matching Ms in G′
7 Return M∗ =M ∪Ms
matching in an HR instance. This is used to prove that the output of the above algorithm is
a maximum size envy-free matching containing M .
I Lemma 27. The matchingM∗ output by Algorithm 3 is a maximum size envy-free matching
with the property M ⊆M∗.
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that M ′ is an envy-free matching in G such
that M ′ =M ∪Mx and |M ′| > |M∗|. We first claim that Mx ⊆ E′. If not, then there exists
(r, h) ∈Mx where (r, h) /∈ E′. However, note that (r, h) does not belong to E′ implies that
there is a threshold resident rh such that rh prefers h over M(rh) and h prefers rh over r′.
Thus, rh has justified envy towards r w.r.t. M ′ – this contradicts the assumption that M ′ is
envy-free.
Recall that G′ is an HR instance and Ms is a stable matching in G′. To complete the
proof it suffices to note that a stable matching in G′ is a maximum size envy-free matching
in G′ by Lemma 13. J
4.3 FPT algorithms for MAXEFM
In this section, we give FPT algorithms for theMAXEFM problem on several sets of parameters.
Our first set of parameters is the number of lower-quota hospitals q and the maximum length
of the preference list of any lower-quota hospital `. The algorithm is simple: it tries all
possible assignments Me of residents to lower-quota hospitals. If some assignment is not
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envy-free we discard it. Otherwise we use Algorithm 3 to output a maximum size envy-free
matching containingMe. Since our algorithm tries out all possible assignments to lower-quota
hospitals, and the extension of Me is a maximum cardinality envy-free matching containing
Me (by Lemma 27) it is clear that the algorithm outputs a maximum size envy-free matching.
I Lemma 28. The MAXEFM problem is FPT when the parameters are the number of
lower-quota hospitals (q) and length of the longest preference list of any lower-quota hospital
(`).
Proof. For an lower-quota hospital h, there are at most 2` possible ways of assigning residents
to h. Since the number of lower-quota hospitals is q, our algorithm considers 2`·q many
different matchings. Testing whether a matching Me is envy-free and to extend it to a
maximum size envy-free matching containing Me using Algorithm 3 needs linear time. Thus
we have an O∗(2`·q) time algorithm for the MAXEFM problem. Here O∗ hides polynomial
terms in n and m. J
We give the following FPT result when the quotas are at most one. Let Rd be the set of
residents that are acceptable to at least one deficient hospital. Let s = |Rd|. We denote the
deficiency of the given HRLQ instance by d. We prove that the MAXEFM problem is FPT if
parameters are s and d.
I Lemma 29. The MAXEFM problem is FPT when the number of deficient hospitals (d)
and the total number of residents acceptable to deficient hospitals (s) are parameters.
Proof. We use bounded branching algorithm presented in Algorithm 4. Matching in line 2
is computed using EF-HR-LQ algorithm in [25]. For every deficient hospital h (w.r.t. stable
matching), we branch on every resident r in the preference list of h. Any matching computed
along the branch r of h has (r, h). In every branch, we prune the preference lists such that
possible envy-pairs w.r.t. current matching are removed. If we run out of preference list
at a particular level, we mark the branch as “invalid” and do not progress on that branch.
This generates a bounded branching tree that has at most d levels and s branches at each
level. We process each valid leaf l as follows. Let Al be the partial matching (assignment)
we have computed along the branch that connects l with the root. We compute a stable
matching M on the pruned instance Gl. Since we removed possible envy-pairs at each level,
it is guaranteed that Ml is envy-free. If Ml is not feasible, we discard it otherwise we choose
the largest size such matching across all valid leaf nodes as the output.
Correctness: At every step, the instance is pruned to remove future envy, so it is easy to
see that the matching output is envy-free. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there
exists another larger envy-free matching M∗ than the matching M output by Algorithm 4.
There must exist at least one hospital h ∈ H ′ which has at least one different partner in M
and M∗. But, since we are considering all possible assignments to deficient hospitals, we
must have considered the assignment in M∗ as well. So, we could not have missed out a
larger envy-free matching.
Running time: It is clear that there are at most sd possible leaf nodes. Removing
future envy and computing stable matching takes O(m). So, overall running time is O(m ·sd).
Hence, MAXEFM is FPT if parameters are number of deficient hospitals (d) and the total
number of unique residents acceptable to deficient hospitals (s). J
Now we consider total number of residents acceptable to lower-quota hospitals as a
parameter and present a parameterized algorithm when quotas are at most one.
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Algorithm 4: FPT algorithm for MAXEFM parameterized in s, d
Input: Input: HRLQ instance containing feasible envy-free matching
Output: Output: Maximum size feasible envy-free matching
1 Let H ′ = {h ∈ H | h is deficient in a stable matching}
2 M∗ = Yokoi’s matching
3 while H ′ is not empty do
4 Pick h ∈ H ′
5 if Preference list of h is empty then
6 Mark the branch “invalid”
7 For every resident r in h’s preference list, create a branch and match (r, h)
8 In every branch l, prune the instance by removing future envy i.e.
E = E \ {(r′, h′) | h′ is more preferred by r than h and r′ is less preferred by h′
than r}
9 foreach valid leaf l do
10 Let Al be the assignment to deficient hospitals
11 Let Gl be the pruned instance
12 Compute a stable matching M in Gl
13 Let Ml =M ∪Al
14 if Ml is not feasible then
15 Discard Ml
16 if |Ml| > |M∗| then
17 M∗ =Ml
18 return M∗;
I Lemma 30. The MAXEFM problem parameterized on the total number of residents accept-
able to lower-quota hospitals is FPT.
Proof. Consider R′ = {r ∈ R | ∃h ∈ HLQ such that (r, h) ∈ E}. Thus, R′ is the set of resid-
ents acceptable to at least one lower-quota hospital. Algorithm 5 is FPT for the parameter
|R′|. Yokoi’s matching in line 1 is computed using using Yokoi’s EF-HR-LQ algorithm [25].
Matching in line 6 is computed using Algorithm 3.
Correctness: We consider all possible assignments to residents in R′ using branching. We
discard an assignment that is infeasible or not envy-free. Thus, we consider all possible
envy-free and feasible assignments and extend them using Algorithm 3. By Lemma 27, M is
maximum size envy-free matching that contains A and we pick the largest among them.
Running time: There are |R′|! possible assignments to check. Finding if an assignment is
feasible and envy-free takes O(m). Computing maximum size envy-free matching containing
a given assignment takes O(m). So, overall running time is O(m · |R′|!).
Hence, MAXEFM is FPT if parameter is the number of residents acceptable to lower-quota
hospitals. J
This establishes Theorem 8(III).
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Algorithm 5: FPT algorithm for MAXEFM parameterized in |R′|
Input: HRLQ instance containing feasible envy-free matching
Output: Maximum size feasible envy-free matching
1 M∗ = Yokoi’s matching
2 foreach assignment A between R′ and HLQ do
3 if A is not feasible or not envy-free then
4 discard A
5 else
6 Compute maximum size envy-free matching M containing A
7 if |M | > |M∗| then
8 M∗ =M
9 return M∗
5 Relaxed Stability
In this section, we present our results related to the relaxed stability in HRLQ instance. We
prove that MAXRSM is NP-hard and hard to approximate within a factor of 2119 unless P = NP.
Then we present a simple efficient algorithm which gives a 32 -approximation guarantee for
MAXRSM.
5.1 NP-hardness and inapproximability of MAXRSM
In this section, we show a reduction from the Minimum Vertex Cover (MVC) to the MAXRSM.
Reduction: Given a graph G = (V,E), which is an instance of the MVC problem, we
construct an instance G′ of the MAXRSM problem. Let n = |V |. Corresponding to each
vertex vi in G, G′ contains a gadget with three residents ri1, ri2, ri3, and three hospitals
hi1, h
i
2, h
i
3. All hospitals have an upper-quota of 1 and hi3 has a lower-quota of 1. Assume
that the vertex vi has d neighbors in G, namely vj1 , . . . , vjd . The preference lists of the
three residents and three hospitals are shown in Fig. 9. We impose an arbitrary but fixed
ordering on the vertices which is used as a strict ordering of neighbors in the preference lists
of resident ri1 and hospital hi2 in G′. Note that G′ has N = 3|V | residents and hospitals.
ri1 : hi3, h
j1
2 , h
j2
2 , . . . , h
jd
2 , h
i
1
ri2 : hi2, hi3
ri3 : hi2
[0, 1] hi1 : ri1
[0, 1] hi2 : ri2, r
j1
1 , r
j2
2 , . . . , r
jd
2 , r
i
3
[1, 1] hi3 : ri2, ri1
Figure 9 Preferences of residents and hospitals corresponding to a vertex vi in G.
I Lemma 31. Let G′ be the instance of the MAXRSM problem constructed as above from an
instance G = (V,E) of the minimum vertex cover problem. If V C(G) denotes a minimum
vertex cover of G and OPT (G′) denotes a maximum size relaxed stable matching in G′, then
|OPT (G′)| = 3|V | − |V C(G)|.
Proof. We first prove that |OPT (G′)| ≥ 3|V | − |V C(G)|. Given a minimum vertex
cover V C(G) of G we construct a relaxed stable matching M for G′ as follows. M =
{(ri1, hi3), (ri2, hi2) | vi ∈ V C(G)}∪{(ri1, hi1), (ri2, hi3), (ri3, hi2) | vi /∈ V C(G)}. Thus, |OPT (G′)| ≥
|M | = 2|V C(G)|+ 3(|V | − |V C(G)|) = 3|V | − |V C(G)|.
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B Claim 32. M is relaxed stable in G′.
Proof. When vi ∈ V C(G), residents ri1 and ri2 both are matched to their top choice hospitals
and hospital hi2 is matched to its top choice resident ri2. Thus, when vi ∈ V C(G), no resident
from the i-th gadget participates in a blocking pair. When vi /∈ V C(G), hospitals hi1 and
hi3 are matched to their top choice residents and we ignore blocking pair (ri2, hi2) because ri2
is matched to a lower-quota hospital hi3, thus there is no blocking pair within the gadget
for vi /∈ V C(G). Now suppose that there is a blocking pair (ri1, hj2) for some j such that
(vi, vj) ∈ E. Note that either vi or vj is in V C(G). If vi ∈ V C(G), ri1 is matched to its top
choice hospital hi3, thus cannot participate in a blocking pair. If vi /∈ V C(G), it implies that
vj ∈ V C(G). Then for vj ’s gadget, hj2 is matched to its top choice rj2, thus cannot form a
blocking pair. C
Now we prove that OPT (G′) ≤ 3|V | − |V C(G)|. Let M = OPT (G′) be a maximum size
relaxed stable matching in G′. Consider a vertex vi ∈ V and the corresponding residents
and hospitals in G′. Refer Fig. 10 for the possible patterns caused by vi. Hospital hi3 must
be matched to either resident ri1 (Pattern 1) or resident ri2 (Pattern 2 to Pattern 7). If
(ri1, hi3) ∈M , then the resident ri2 must be matched to a higher preferred hospital hi2 in M .
If (ri2, hi3) ∈M then hi2 may be matched with either ri3 or rj1 of some neighbour vj or may
be left unmatched. Similarly, ri1 can either be matched to hi1 or h
j
2 of some neighbour vj .
This leads to 6 combinations as shown in Fig. 10b to Fig. 10g.
ri1
ri2
ri3
hi1
hi2
hi3
(a) Pattern 1
ri1
ri2
ri3
hi1
hi2
hi3
(b) Pattern 2
ri1
ri2
ri3
hi1
hi2
hi3
(c) Pattern 3
ri1
ri2
ri3
hi1
hi2
hi3
(d) Pattern 4
ri1
ri2
ri3
hi1
hi2
hi3
(e) Pattern 5
ri1
ri2
ri3
hi1
hi2
hi3
(f) Pattern 6
ri1
ri2
ri3
hi1
hi2
hi3
(g) Pattern 7
Figure 10 Seven patterns possibly caused by vertex vi
B Claim 33. A vertex cannot cause pattern 5.
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that a vertex vi causes pattern 5. Then, there
must exist a vertex vj adjacent to vi such that vj causes either pattern 4 or pattern 7.
Case 1: If vertex vj causes pattern 4, then (rj1, hi2) form a blocking pair, a contradiction.
Case 2: If vertex vj causes pattern 7, then there must exist vertices vj+1, . . . , vt such that
there are following edges in G : (vi, vj), (vj , vj+1), (vj+1, vj+2), . . . , (vt−1, vt) and vertices vj
to vt−1 cause pattern 7 and vt causes pattern 4. See Fig. 11. In the vertex ordering, we
must have vj+1 > vi otherwise (rj1, hi2) form a blocking pair. But, since h
j
2 is matched to ri1,
vj+2 > vj . Continuing this way, vt > vt−2 but this causes (rt1, ht−22 ) form a blocking pair.
Thus, the claimed set of edges cannot exist. C
B Claim 34. A vertex cannot cause pattern 3 or 6 or 4.
Proof. In pattern 3 and 6, ri3 participates in a blocking pair (ri3, hi2), contradicting that
M is relaxed stable. If a vertex vi causes pattern 4, then there exists a set of t vertices
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ri1
ri2
ri3
hi1
hi2
hi3
rj1
rj2
rj3
hj1
hj2
hj3
rj+11
rj+12
rj+13
hj+11
hj+12
hj+13
. . .
rt−11
rt−12
rt−13
ht−11
ht−12
ht−13
rt1
rt2
rt3
ht1
ht2
ht3
Figure 11 Pattern combination that is not relaxed stable if vi causes pattern 5.
vi+1, . . . , vi+t such that for 0 ≤ k < t, (vi+k, vi+k+1) is an edge in G and vi+t causes pattern
6. But, since pattern 6 cannot occur, pattern 4 cannot occur. C
Thus, a vertex can cause either pattern 1 or 2 and thus match all the residents and
hospitals within its own gadget or pattern 7 and match r1 and h2 outside its own gadget.
Accordingly there are following cases.
Case 1: A vertex that causes pattern 7 can be adjacent to another vertex that causes
pattern 7, which together give matching size 4 i.e. 2 per vertex.
Case 2: It is clear that a vertex causing pattern 1 or 2 contributes to matching size of 2
or 3 respectively.
Vertex cover C of G corresponding to M : Using M , we now construct the set C
of vertices in G which constitute a vertex cover of G. If vi causes pattern 2, we do not
include it in the C; Otherwise, we include it. We prove that C is a vertex cover. Suppose
not, then there exists an edge (vi, vj) such that both vi and vj cause pattern 2. But, this
means that (ri1, h
j
2) and (r
j
1, h
i
2) form a blocking pair, a contradiction since M is relaxed
stable. Now, it is easy to see that |OPT (G′)| = 2|C| + 3(|V | − |C|) = 3|V | − |C|. Thus,
V C(G) ≤ |C| = 3|V | − |OPT (G′)|. This completes the proof of the lemma. J
Now we prove the hardness of approximation for the MAXRSM problem. Similar to
Lemma 18, Lemma 35 is analogous to Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.4 from [11]. Proof of
Lemma 35 uses the result of Lemma 31 and can be reproduced in a similar manner as done
in Appendix A for Lemma 18. This establishes Theorem 9.
I Lemma 35. It is NP-hard to approximate the MAXRSM problem within a factor of 2119 − δ,
for any constant δ > 0, even when the quotas of all hospitals are either 0 or 1.
5.2 A 32-approximation algorithm for MAXRSM
In this section, we present Algorithm 6 that computes a relaxed stable matching in an HRLQ
instance and prove that it is a 32 -approximation to MAXRSM. Our algorithm is simple to
implement and hence we believe is of practical importance. Furthermore, we show that the
output of Algorithm 6 is at least as large as the stable matching in the instance (disregarding
lower-quotas). Our algorithm is inspired by the one proposed by Király [17].
We say a feasible matching M0 is minimal w.r.t. feasibility if for any edge e ∈M0, the
matching M0 \ {e} is infeasible for the instance. That is for a minimal matching M0, we have
for every hospital h, |M0(h)| = q−(h). Algorithm 6 begins by computing a feasible matching
M0 in the instance G disregarding the preferences of the residents and hospitals. Such a
feasible matching can be computed by the standard reduction from bipartite matchings
to flows with demands on edges [18]. Let M = M0. We now associate levels with the
residents – all residents matched in M are set to have level-0; all residents unmatched in M
are assigned level-1. We now execute the Gale and Shapley resident proposing algorithm,
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with the modification that a hospital prefers any level-1 resident over any level-0 resident
(irrespective of the preference list of h). Furthermore, if a level-0 resident becomes unmatched
during the course of the proposals, then it gets assigned a level-1 and it starts proposing from
the beginning of its preference list. Amongst two residents of the same level, the hospital
uses its preference list in order them. Our algorithm terminates when either every resident
is matched or every resident has exhausted its preference list when proposing hospitals
at level-1. It is clear that our algorithm runs in polynomial time since it only computes
a feasible matching (using a reduction to flows) and executes a modification of Gale and
Shapley algorithm. We prove the correctness of our algorithm below.
Algorithm 6: Algorithm to compute 32 -approximation of MAXRSM
Input: Input: HRLQ instance G = (R∪H, E)
Output: A relaxed stable matching that is a 32 -approximation of MAXRSM
1 M0 is a minimal feasible matching in G. Let M =M0;
2 For every matched resident r, set level of r to level-0;
3 For every unmatched resident r, set level of r to level-1;
4 while there is an unmatched resident r which has not exhausted his preference list do
5 r proposes to the most preferred hospital h to whom he has not yet proposed;
6 if h is under-subscribed then
7 M =M ∪ {(r, h)};
8 else
9 if M(h) has at least one level-0 resident r′ then
10 M =M \ {(r′, h)} ∪ {(r, h)};
11 Set level of r′ to level-1 and r′ starts proposing from the beginning of his
list;
12 else
13 h rejects the least preferred resident in M(h) ∪ r;
14 Return M ;
I Lemma 36. Matching M output by Algorithm 6 is feasible and relaxed stable.
Proof. We note thatM0 is feasible and since Algorithm 6 uses a resident proposing algorithm,
it is clear that for any hospital h, we have |M(h)| ≥ |M0(h)| = q−(h). Thus M is feasible.
To show relaxed stability, we claim that when the algorithm terminates, a resident at
level-1 does not participate in a blocking pair. Whenever a level-1 resident r proposes to
a hospital h, resident r always gets accepted except when h is fully-subscribed and all the
residents matched to h are level-1 and are better preferred than r. When a matched level-1
resident r is rejected by a hospital h, h gets a better preferred resident than r. Thus, a level-1
resident does not participate in a blocking pair. We note that every unmatched resident is a
level-1 resident and hence does not participate in a blocking pair. Recall that all residents
matched in M0 are level-0 residents and M0 is minimal. This implies that for every hospital
h, at most q−(h) many residents assigned to h in M0 participate in a blocking pair. We show
that in M , the number of level-0 residents assigned to any hospital does not increase. To see
this, if r is matched to h in M , but not matched to h in M0, it implies that either r was
unmatched in M0 or r was matched to some h′ in M0. In either case r becomes level-1 when
it gets assigned to h in M . Thus the number of level-0 residents assigned to any hospital
h in M is at most q−(h), all of which can potentially participate in blocking pairs. This
completes the proof that M is relaxed stable. J
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I Lemma 37. Matching M output by Algorithm 6 is a 32 -approximation to the maximum
size relaxed stable matching.
Proof. Let OPT denote the maximum size relaxed stable matching in G. To prove the lemma
we show that in M ⊕OPT there does not exist any one length as well as any three length
augmenting path. To do this, we first convert the matchings M and OPT as one-to-one
matchings, by making clones of the hospital. In particular we make q+(h) many copies of
the hospital h for every h where the first q−(h) copies are called lower-quota copies and the
q−(h) + 1 to q+(h) copies are called non lower-quota copies of h.
Let M1 denote the one-to-one matching corresponding to M . To obtain M1, we assign
every resident r ∈M(h) to a unique copy of h as follows: first, all the residents in M(h) who
participate in blocking pair w.r.t. M are assigned unique lower-quota copies of h arbitrarily.
The remaining residents in M(h) are assigned to the rest of the copies of h, ensuring all
lower-quota copies get assigned some resident. We get OPT1 from OPT in the same manner.
Suppose that (r, h) is a one length augmenting path w.r.t. M in M ⊕ OPT such that
r is unmatched and h is under-subscribed in M . Recall that an unmatched resident is a
level-1 resident, hence r is a level-1 resident. Thus, r must have proposed to h during the
execution of algorithm. Since, r is unmatched, it implies that h must be fully-subscribed in
M , a contradiction. Thus, there is no one length augmenting path in M ⊕OPT .
Next, suppose there exists a three length augmenting path w.r.t. M which starts at
an under-subscribed hospital, say hj and ends at an unmatched resident in M . Since hj
is under-subscribed in M , and there is an augmenting path starting at hj , it implies that
there exists a copy hdj such that (i) hdj is matched in OPT1 and unmatched in M1, say
OPT1(hdj ) = rd and (ii) the resident rd is matched in M1 (otherwise there is a one length
augmenting path w.r.t. M1, which does not exist); let M1(rd) = hci , and (iii) the copy hci is
matched in OPT1 and OPT1(hci ) = rc is unmatched in M1 (else the claimed three length
augmenting path does not exist).
We first note that hci and hcj are not copies of the same hospital, that is, i 6= j, otherwise
there is a one length augmenting path (rc, hi) w.r.t. M . Since rc is unmatched in M1 (and
hence M), the resident rc is a level-1 resident. Therefore, rc must have proposed to hi
during the course of the algorithm. Thus, hi is fully-subscribed and is matched to all level-1
residents all of which are better preferred over rc. This implies that rd >hi rc and rd is a
level-1 resident. Since rd is a level-1 resident, it proposed to hospitals from the beginning of
its preference list. Since hj is under-subscribed, it must be the case that hi >rd hj . Thus,
(rd, hi) is a blocking pair w.r.t. OPT . By the construction of OPT1 from OPT , we must
have assigned rd to a lower-quota copy of hj . However, copy hdj is a non lower-quota copy,
since it is unassigned in M1, a contradiction. Thus, the claimed three length augmenting
path does not exist. J
r1 : h1
r2 : h1, h2
r3 : h3, h2
[0, 1] h1 : r2, r1
[1, 1] h2 : r2, r3
[0, 1] h3 : r3
Figure 12 A tight example for Algorithm 6
We note that the analysis of our Al-
gorithm 6 is tight. Consider the HRLQ
instance in Fig. 12 and a minimal feas-
ible matching M0 = {(r3, h2)}. Al-
gorithm 6 computes matching M =
{(r3, h2), (r2, h1)}. Maximum size relaxed
stable matching in this instance is OPT =
{(r1, h1), (r2, h2), (r3, h3)} and M ⊕ OPT
admits a five length augmenting path
〈r1, h1, r2, h2, r3, h3〉. We also show that every resident matched in stable matching (ig-
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noring lower quotas) is also matched in M that is output by Algorithm 6, implying that M
is at least as large as any stable matching.
I Lemma 38. A resident matched in a stable matching is also matched in M . Hence M is
at least as large as any stable matching in that instance.
Proof. Let Ms be a stable matching. By Rural Hospitals theorem, we know that the same
set of residents are matched in all the stable matchings. Hence, it is enough to prove that
a resident r matched in Ms is also matched in M . Suppose not. Then r must be a level-1
resident. Let Ms(r) = h. Since M is relaxed stable, h must be fully-subscribed in M with
residents who are level-1 and better preferred over r. All these residents in M(h) must be
matched and matched to a higher preferred hospital than h in Ms otherwise they form a
blocking pair w.r.t. Ms. But, since they are level-1, their matched partners in Ms must be
fully-subscribed in M with residents who are level-1 and better preferred than them. Thus,
a path starting at r who is claimed to be unmatched in M cannot terminate at either a
resident or a hospital, a contradiction since there are finite number of hospitals and residents.
Hence, every resident matched in Ms is matched in M . J
6 Discussion
In this paper we consider computing matchings with two-sided preferences and lower-quotas.
A thorough investigation of the notion of envy-freeness from a computational perspective
reveals that the MAXEFM problem is NP-hard, and hard to approximate within a constant
factor 2119 . In future, it will be nice to improve the approximation guarantee for the MAXEFM
problem. For the new notion of relaxed stability, we show desirable properties like guaranteed
existence, and an efficient constant factor approximation for the MAXRSM problem. However,
the gap between the approximation guarantee and hardness of approximation remains to be
bridged.
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A Missing proofs from section 2.2 and section 5.1
As stated earlier, Lemma 18 is analogous to Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.4 from [11]. For
completeness, we reproduce the proof below.
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I Proposition 39. [3] For any  > 0 and p < 3−
√
5
2 , the following statement holds: If there
exists a polynomial time algorithm that, given a graph G = (V,E), distinguishes between the
following two cases, then P = NP.
1. |V C(G)| ≤ (1− p+ )|V |
2. |V C(G)| > (1−max{p2, 4p3 − 3p4} − )|V |
Proposition 39, Lemma 15 and N = 3|V | together imply following lemma.
I Lemma 40. For any  > 0 and p < 3−
√
5
2 , the following statement holds: If there exists a
polynomial time algorithm that, given a MAXEFM instance G′ consisting of N residents and
4N
3 hospitals, distinguishes between the following two cases, then P = NP.
1. |OPT (G′)| ≥ 2+p−3 N
2. |OPT (G′)| < 2+max{p2,4p3−3p4}+3 N
Proof of Lemma 18. As in [11], we substitute p = 13 in Lemma 40 to obtain the simplified
cases as follows.
1. |OPT (G′)| ≥ 21−27 N
2. |OPT (G′)| < 19+27 N
Now, suppose we have a polynomial-time approximation algorithm for the MAXEFM problem
with an approximation factor of at most 2119 − δ, δ > 0. Consider the above two cases
with a fixed constant,  < 361δ40−19δ . For an instance of case (1), this algorithm outputs a
matching of size ≥ 21−27 N 12119−δ , and for an instance of case (2), it outputs a matching of
size < 19+27 N . By our setting of , we can easily verify that
21−
27 N
1
21
19−δ
> 19+27 N . Hence
using this approximation algorithm, we can distinguish between instances of the two cases,
implying that P = NP. This completes the proof of the lemma. J
Following remark is also analogous to Remark 3.6 from [11].
I Remark 41. A long standing conjecture [16] states that MVC is hard to approximate within
a factor of 2 − ,  > 0. We obtain a lower bound of 1.25 on the approximation ratio of
MAXEFM, modulo this conjecture.
Proof. Suppose we have an r-approximation algorithm for the MAXEFM problem. Let
G = (V,E) be such that |V C(G)| ≥ |V |2 . Approximability of MVC for general graphs is
equivalent to the approximability of MVC for graphs with this property [21]. Using reduction
provided obtain a MAXEFM instance G′. We showed that |OPT (G′)| = 3|V | − |V C(G)|.
Suppose we are given a maximal envy-free matching, M for G′, obtained using this algorithm,
we can construct a vertex cover C for G with |C| ≤ 3|V |−|M |. SinceM is an r-approximation
to OPT (G′), we have |M | ≥ |OPT (G′)|r . Combining these constraints we get,
|C| ≤ 3|V | − |M |
≤
(
6− 5
r
)
|V C(G)|
On substituting r = 1.25− δ in the above equation (0 < δ ≤ 0.25), we see that 1 ≤ 6− 5r < 2.
Thus, effectively we have constructed a vertex cover C, which is a k-approximation to V C(G),
where 1 ≤ k < 2. This contradicts the conjecture that MVC is hard to approximate within a
factor of 2− ,  > 0. This completes the proof. J
Proof of Lemma 35 can be reproduced in a similar manner as the proof for Lemma 18 and
using the result from Lemma 31 in place of Lemma 15.
